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Graham Coppes 
I.  ABSTRACT 
 On January 16, 2014, the Supreme Court of Montana reversed and remanded a district court 
decision that had foreclosed the public’s right to access the Ruby River.  The Court held that the right of 
way was a public prescriptive easement, which extended beyond the road surface itself to include such 
area as necessary for the county to maintain the road in the interest of the public.  Furthermore, the 
Court concluded that once a public right-of-way is established by prescriptive use, the scope of current 
and future use of such an easement is not limited to those historic adversarial practices which gave rise 
to the easement, but rather is subject to uses that are incidental to original uses or “reasonably 
foreseeable.”  Finally, the Court found the adjacent landowner’s takings claim to be without merit 
because any compensable interest had been expressly severed by his predecessor in title and the 
enactment of the state’s Stream Access Law, which encumbered his deed with an inalienable public 
servitude.  This decision clarifies potential ambiguities surrounding the public’s right to use roads and 
bridges for recreational access to Montana’s public lands.  Ultimately, the Court protected Montana’s 
legacy of public access to its world famous rivers, consistent with its decisions on the issue over the past 
several decades. 
II. Introduction 
This case involves modern public use of several public roads in Madison County, Montana (“the 
County”) and the relationship of those permissible uses to property rights of landowners whose parcels 
abut such roads.  The Public Lands Access Association (PLAA) appealed the decision of the district 
court that public roads created by prescriptive easement carry a diminished right-of-way width, allowing 
only public use of the road surface itself.  On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the 
trial court erred in determining that the road carried two distinguishable rights-of-way, held by the 
public and the county, respectively.1  The Court found that the dimensions of a right-of way created by 
prescriptive use are not limited by the width of that road’s physical surface, but extend out to and 
include “whatever land is reasonably necessary to support and maintain the road and for the road to be 
safely and conveniently used.”2  Similarly, the Court held that once established, modern use of public 
prescriptive roadway easements are not limited to the historic adversarial uses, but rather, the scope of 
these types of easements are more properly defined by “public uses that are reasonably incident to the 
uses through which the easement was acquired and uses that are reasonably foreseeable.”3  Ultimately, 
the court concluded that using Seyler Lane to access the Ruby River at its intersection was a foreseeable 
use of a public road right-of-way that crosses a river.4   
Addressing the case’s final issue, the Court determined that the takings argument raised by cross-
appellant landowner James Cox Kennedy (Kennedy) was precluded by the express right-of-way granted 
to the county by his predecessor in title, which was attached to his deed at the time of his acquisition.5  
Furthermore, the Court held that the state of Montana could not have taken a compensable property 
interest from Kennedy through the enactment of the Stream Access Law because at the time title was 
transferred to him, the property already carried with it a dominant estate in favor of the public, and thus 
no right to exclude had been taken from him.6 
III. Background 
 The three roads at issue in this case (Duncan, Lewis and Seyler) cross the Ruby River (“the 
river”) in Madison County.  All three bridges were originally built by and are currently maintained 
through the resources of the County.  Kennedy owns the land immediately adjacent to the rights-of-way 
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on both Seyler and Lewis Lane.7  In May of 2004, PLAA filed suit against the County, seeking a 
declaratory judgment in favor of the public’s right to access the river from those bridges after local 
landowners erected fences to prevent such use.8  Kennedy intervened as a defendant, along with the 
Montana Stockgrowers Association and Hamilton Ranches.9  Both parties moved for summary judgment 
and in October 2008 the district court issued an order stating that both Duncan District Road and Lewis 
Lane carried public rights-of-way, each 60 feet in width, but because the right-of-way on Seyler Lane 
was created through prescriptive use, additional fact finding was necessary to delineate the width of its 
easement as well as to ascertain the public’s right of access to the river from it.10  Consequently, both 
parties’ motions for summary judgment were denied and a trial was set to resolve the remaining issues.11 
 Before trial, the parties stipulated to several facts, including that Seyler Bridge and its 
approaches on Seyler Lane are located on land owned in fee by Kennedy and both hold a county road 
right-of-way, established by prescriptive use.12  The public’s right to use the paved portions of both was 
undisputed.13  On April 16, 2012, the district court held that “PLAA failed to prove the existence of a 
public prescriptive easement beyond the fences14 at Seyler Bridge by clear and convincing evidence”15 
and that the logical result of this failure was that “there is no public right whatsoever on either side of 
Seyler Lane outside the fences or beyond the traveled way where there is no fence.”16  The district 
court’s final judgment further provided that “Madison County has a prescriptive right independent and 
separate from public use to lateral and subjacent support for Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge, together 
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with such additional land as is reasonable and necessary for maintenance and repair.”17  PLAA appealed; 
Kennedy cross-appealed the court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment. 
IV. Analysis 
 The Montana Supreme Court reviews findings of fact for clear error.  Rulings on motions for 
summary judgment are reviewed de novo.  At the outset of its discussion, the Supreme Court 
synthesized PLAA’s appellate contentions into a single foundational question: “May the public use the 
Seyler Lane right-of-way to access the Ruby River?”18  The Court then broke this issue into two separate 
sub-questions: “What is the width of the Seyler Lane right-of-way, and may the public use the right-of-
way for recreational purposes?”19 
A. Width of the public right-of-way at the intersection of Seyler Lane and the Ruby River 
 
 Because the trial court based its ruling on finding two distinct easements, the Court was 
compelled to analyze the difference between private and public rights-of-way that were created through 
prescriptive use.  Highlighting that the district court relied exclusively on case law relating to private 
easements, the Court engaged in a review of its past decisions involving analogous public prescriptive 
easements.20  Citing both statutory21 and common law authority22, the Court held that it was improper 
for the trial court to uncouple a road’s maintenance easement from the public’s easement for travel.23  
The Court held that the applicable rule for public easements is that “the width of a public prescriptive 
roadway extends beyond the traveled portion of the road to include areas necessary for its support and 
maintenance”24 and “for the road to be safely and conveniently used.”25  This conclusion left the exact 
dimensions of the easements at issue here to be decided in accordance with the above stated principles.   
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 The Court began this inquiry by laying out the foundational rule that “the width of a roadway 
acquired by prescription is ‘determined as a question of fact by the character and extent of its use and 
may be more or less than the width of highways established by statute.’”26 As a result, the Court found 
the district court’s determination was further in error because it “must consider, in addition to the land 
necessary to support and maintain the road, historical evidence of the nature of the enjoyment by which 
the public acquired the right-of-way.”27  As to the bridge structure itself, the Court found that based on 
substantial precedent “a bridge is a part of the public road upon which it is built.”28  To this end, the 
Court ruled that the controlling authority made clear that “Seyler Bridge, including its appurtenances, 
additions, alterations, improvements and replacements and the approaches to the bridge, lands used in 
connection with the bridge, and improvements incident or integral to the bridge, is part of the Seyler 
Lane county road right-of-way.”29   
In connection with this holding, the Court held the district court’s universal exclusion of historic 
evidence of recreational use by the public in error.30  Acknowledging its own exclusion of such evidence 
in prior cases, the Court explained that it never intended to bar this type of evidence indefinitely.31  
Rather, the Court clarified that historical evidence of recreational use “may be one factor in determining 
‘the nature of the enjoyment’ by which the public road right-of-way was acquired.”32  Thus, the exact 
width of the “single, unified, public road right-of-way at Seyler Lane” was left to be established on 
remand, including evidence of recreational use.33 
 B. The Scope of Permissible Uses on Roadway Right-of-Ways Created by Prescriptive Use 
 
Next, the Court turned to the question of whether “PLAA is required to show that particular 
areas within the public road right-of-way have been used adversely to access the Ruby River in order for 
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the public to now use them as such.”34  The Court found that “the scope includes public uses that are 
reasonably incident to the uses through which the easement was acquired and uses that are reasonably 
foreseeable.” 35  Thus, the Court found that once a public prescriptive road is established, future uses are 
not restricted to only those which were adversely held.36  In conclusion, the Court stated, “foot travel 
over a roadway is, and has always been, a foreseeable use of the road surface as well as any shoulders, 
embankments and abutments supporting the roadway[,]” and thus, using the road to access to the Ruby 
River was also reasonably foreseeable.37 
 C.  Kennedy’s Cross-Appeal on his Motion For Summary Judgment for Taking 
The Court upheld the district court’s ruling rejecting Kennedy’s takings claims.  The Montana 
Constitution provides that the state owns navigable and non-navigable waters in public trust and, as a 
result, the Court found Kennedy’s reliance on federal law to be misguided.  Highlighting case law 
construing proper deed interpretation and the continuity of attached easements,38 the Court focused on 
the intent of the parties in drafting, ultimately finding no evidence that Kennedy’s predecessor in title 
“did not intend to authorize access to the Ruby River from Lewis Lane for public fishing, wading, 
hunting or other uses”39 because the deed itself expressly stated that the land was to be used as a “public 
highway” and held no further restrictions on public use.40 
The Court swiftly rejected Kennedy’s claim that the state’s Stream Access Law itself acts to 
divest him of his constitutionally protected right to due process by taking his compensable interest in 
exclusion without compensation.  The Court based this rejection on two fronts.  First, because 
“Kennedy’s predecessor in interest deeded Lewis Lane to the County, he also granted the swath of 
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riverbed underlying the bridge and within the right-of-way to the public.”41  Second, because Kennedy’s 
predecessor did not exclude the land underlying the bridge from the deed conveying the right-of-way, 
the public retains the right to use this “bought-and-paid-for right-of-way.”42  The Court also explained 
that even if Kennedy’s predecessor had not expressly granted a public right-of-way to the County, the 
law surrounding the state’s Stream Access Law is well settled and dictates that the public has a right to 
use the beds of non-navigable rivers, up to the high water mark, for recreation.43 Since title to non-
navigable riverbeds did not pass to the public through the enactment of the Stream Access Law, the 
public holds no ownership interest in private streambeds.44  Because “Kennedy never owned a property 
right that allowed him to exclude the public from using its water resource” which includes the riverbed 
and banks up to the high water mark, the Court concluded that nothing had been taken from him.45  
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